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407 
CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR INTERNET 
CULPRITS: THE NEED FOR UPDATED STATE 
LAWS COVERING THE FULL SPECTRUM OF 
CYBER VICTIMIZATION 
I. INTRODUCTION  
On October 16, 2006, Tina Meier found her thirteen-year-old daughter, 
Megan, hanging from a belt inside her closet.
1
 The situation was a tragedy 
from the start for Tina and her husband, Ron, who pieced together what 
had seemingly pushed Megan to her unexpected suicide.
2
 Megan had only 
gotten to know sixteen-year-old Josh Evans through the cloaked world of 
an internet social network after he contacted her on MySpace.
3
 But when, 
after a month of flirtation, Josh inexplicably became cruel, Megan grew 
distraught.
4
 The day before she took her own life, Josh had publicly posted 
her private messages, as well as his own harsh comments calling her ―fat‖ 
and a ―slut,‖ for others to read and laugh at.5 It was the very day that she 
died though, just twenty minutes before Megan went through with her act 
of suicide, that she had received a message from Josh telling her: 
―Everybody in O'Fallon knows how you are. You are a bad person and 
everybody hates you. Have a shitty rest of your life. The world would be a 
better place without you.‖6 
It was not until six weeks later that the Meiers learned the true extent of 
the tragedy underlying their daughter‘s death; a young girl from the 
neighborhood came forward and informed them that Josh had never 
existed.
7
 It turned out the fictitious boy had been created to ―mess with 
 
 
 1. Christopher Maag, A Hoax Turned Fatal Draws Anger but No Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
28, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/28/us/28hoax.html?_r=1&oref=slogin. 
 2. Id. (explaining that, while Megan had spoken of suicide before, she had never acted upon 
such thoughts in the past, and she was not believed to be suicidal by her doctor or parents). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Andrew M. Grossman, The MySpace Suicide: A Case Study in Overcriminalization, 32 THE 
HERITAGE FOUND. 2 (2008), http://www.heritage.org/Research/ LegalIssues/lm32.cfm. 
 6. See Steve Pokin, My Space Hoax Ends with Suicide of Dardenne Prairie Teen, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 11, 2007, http://suburbanjournals.stltoday.com/articles/2007/11/13/news/sj2tn 
20071110-1111stc_pokin_1.ii1.txt (explaining that the FBI was not able to retrieve the final message 
from the Meier‘s computer hard drive, and that the quoted language is ―according to Ron [Meier]‘s 
best recollection,‖ what he believes to be Josh‘s final message as he viewed it on Megan‘s MySpace 
account shortly after her death). 
 7. Maag, supra note 1; see also Pokin, supra note 6 (explaining that the girl who came forward 
to the Meiers had sent one message to Megan from the phony MySpace account, and that after the 
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Megan,‖8 not by a sixteen-year-old at all, but rather, by a forty-seven-year-
old woman who lived four houses away from the Meiers in Dardenne 
Prairie, Missouri.
9
 Lori Drew‘s original intent was apparently grounded in 
a desire to find out what Megan would say about her daughter, a former 
friend of Megan‘s.10 There is no reason to believe that Drew actually 
intended to bring about Megan‘s death.11 But, arguably, she deliberately 
participated in a ploy that would foreseeably cause an adolescent to suffer 
severe emotional distress.
12
 The emotional distress that Megan endured as 
a result of the internet ploy was particularly foreseeable for Drew, because 
Megan had struggled with depression issues in the past
13
 and Drew was 
aware of Megan‘s emotional fragility.14  
 
 
ambulance arrived at the Meier‘s home, Drew had called the girl, instructing her not to disclose the 
MySpace hoax to anyone).  
 8. Maag, supra note 1. 
 9. Id.; see also Lauren Collins, Friend Game; Behind the Online Hoax that Led to a Girl’s 
Suicide, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 21, 2008, http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/01/21/ 
080121fa_fact_collins?currentPage=all (―Initially, a police officer wrote in a report that Lori Drew had 
‗instigated‘ and ‗monitored‘ the account; she now contends the report is inaccurate, and has asserted 
that she merely agreed to the idea, which her daughter and Ashley Grills, the eighteen-year-old who 
worked for a direct-mail business that the Drews ran from their dining room, initiated.‖); Pokin, supra 
note 6 (explaining that, in addition to Drew and the neighbor that came forward, Drew‘s daughter and 
Drew‘s employee also allegedly contributed to the communication with Megan under the alias of 
―Josh‖ on the phony MySpace account). 
 10. Collins, supra note 9 (―The purpose of ‗Josh Evans,‘ according to the Drews‘ testimony to 
Jack Banas [the prosecuting attorney for St. Charles County], was to ascertain whether Megan was 
making nasty remarks about their daughter, whom Megan had previously called a ‗lesbian.‘‖); see also 
Pokin, supra note 6. 
 11. Pokin, supra note 6 (quoting Tina Meier: ―‗She wanted to get Megan to feel like she was 
liked by a boy and let everyone know this was a false MySpace and have everyone laugh at her. I don't 
feel their intentions were for her to kill herself. But that‘s how it ended‘‖); see also Pokin, supra note 
6, (quoting Ron Meier: ―‗Ultimately, it was Megan‘s choice to do what she did,‘ he says. ‗But it was 
like someone handed her a loaded gun.‘‖). 
 12. See Collins, supra note 9. Whoever, exactly, came up with ―Josh‖ conjured more than a 
perfunctory decoy. An online Frankenstein‘s monster, geared to the needs of an insecure, excitable 
teen-age girl, Josh‘s components were carefully chosen to exploit Megan‘s vulnerabilities. His profile 
picture was lifted from that of a handsome teen-age boy. He listened to Rascal Flatts, Korn, and 
Nickelback. His ―turn-ons‖ included tongue piercings and being nibbled on the ear.  
 Playing on Megan‘s susceptibility to underdogs, Josh‘s creators endowed him with a pitiable bio: 
―when I was 7 my dad left me and my mom and my older brother and my newborn brother . . . poor 
mom yeah she had such a hard time . . . finding work to pay for us after he left.‖ His ambitions also 
seemed tweaked to Megan‘s desires. His answer to the section ―Goal you would like to achieve this 
year‖ was ―meet a great girl.‖ The girl he was looking for happened to have long brown hair, like 
Megan. As for weight, Josh answered, ―DONT REALLY MATTER.‖ Id. 
 13. Id. (―In the third grade, Megan told Tina that she wanted to kill herself. The Meiers took her 
to see a psychiatrist. Megan was prescribed Celexa (an antidepression drug), Concerta (for A.D.D.), 
and Geodon (a mood stabilizer).‖). 
 14. See Pokin, supra note 6 (explaining that, because the Drews had taken Megan with them on 
vacations, they were aware that she had a history of depression and that she took medication for her 
condition). 
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Since the hoax that preceded Megan‘s suicide became public 
knowledge, the incident has often been referred to as an unfortunate 
example of ―cyberbullying.‖15 However, scholarly discussions about 
―cyberbullies‖ tend to pertain to minors and the question of whether 
schools have the legal right to discipline them.
16
 Lori Drew‘s behavior 
made it clear that cyberbullying is not limited to students targeting their 
peers, and that a solution extending beyond school discipline may be 
necessary.
17
 While similar problems have been recognized amongst adults 
in the context of cyberharassment and cyberstalking, it is difficult to 
ascertain the difference between these three forms of internet 
victimization, especially because they are often used interchangeably. 
Ultimately, since there are no universal terms with corresponding sets of 
definitions to describe the acts that internet culprits commit,
18
 scholarly 
discussions surrounding different forms of internet victimization have 
become muddled with confusing overlaps regarding both the ages of the 
persons involved and the severity of the culprit‘s conduct.19 Such overlaps 
thwart clear analysis and the creation of successful solutions. 
While many states have taken steps to account for the increased 
dangers posed by internet victimization, there is a need for more complete 
coverage in this area of law to account for the full spectrum of problematic 
behavior in the cyber context. This Note begins, in Part II, by presenting 
the current labels for victimizing internet behavior and their overlapping 
definitions as they are discussed in academic literature. Part III then 
explains why all forms of cyber victimization involve enhanced risks 
because of the internet‘s unique characteristics. Next, Part IV describes the 
current spectrum of state statutes in this area of criminal law, providing 
examples of how states‘ criminal codes do not account for all forms of 
cyber victimization independently. Part V then explains why states should 
 
 
 15. See, e.g., Matthew C. Ruedy, Note, Repercussions of a MySpace Teen Suicide: Should Anti-
Cyberbullying Laws Be Created?, 9 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 323, 326 (2008). 
 16. See generally Tracy L. Adamovich, Note, Return to Sender: Off-Campus Student Speech 
Brought On-Campus by Another Student, 82 ST. JOHN‘S L. REV. 1087 (2008); Cara J. Ottenweller, 
Note, Cyberbullying: The Interactive Playground Cries for a Clarification of the Communications 
Decency Act, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 1285 (2007); Renee L. Servance, Note, Cyberbullying, Cyber-
Harassment, and the Conflict Between Schools and the First Amendment, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 1213 
(2003). 
 17. Ruedy, supra note 15, at 328 (―The term ‗bullying‘ brings up connotations of a schoolyard 
playground . . . [y]et as evidenced in Megan‘s case, ‗cyberbullying‘ can occur anywhere and by 
anyone, regardless of age.‖). 
 18. Naomi Harlin Goodno, Cyberstalking, a New Crime: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Current 
State and Federal Laws, 72 MO. L. REV. 125, 147 (2007) (―While many states are taking active steps 
to combat the problem of cyberstalking, there is a complete lack of uniformity in defining the crime.‖). 
 19. See discussion infra Part II.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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update their laws to impose criminal liability for all possible forms of 
cyber victimization. Finally, Part VI proposes a three-tiered classification 
of cyber victimization crimes that states could effectively implement. The 
scheme proposed in this Note accounts for conduct that is likely to pertain 
to minors, but it does not involve categorical distinctions based on age. 
Instead, the proposed scheme includes the possibility for both adults and 
young people to be held liable, but breaks down degrees of liability based 
on the culprit‘s intent and the victim‘s harm suffered.20 
II. BLURRED CATEGORIZATIONS: THE TERMS USED TO REFERENCE 
FORMS OF CYBER VICTIMIZATION  
The terms that scholars use to define various forms of cyber 
victimization lack clear distinctions, presenting an initial obstacle to 
creating effective solutions. Cyberstalking, cyberharassment, and 
cyberbullying are the most commonly used terms. The differences 
between these labels pertain to the ages of the parties involved and the 
severity of the victimizing acts at issue. As such, the terms largely blend 
together in scholarly commentary.
21
 
First, the term cyberbullying is typically used in reference to juveniles 
or students, but it is unclear exactly which party must be a minor for the 
situation at issue to constitute cyberbullying. Some commentators consider 
cyberbullying to be the internet counterpart to traditional playground 
bullying, which presupposes that the culprit and the victim are both 
minors.
22
 For others, the term is used to reference ―the victimization of 
minors,‖23 regardless of whether the culprit is himself a minor or an 
adult.
24
 A third definition for cyberbullying requires that the culprit be a 
 
 
 20. This test will balance the need for broader liability with concerns about over-criminalization 
by ensuring that the safety of individuals of all ages will be protected, but also that less egregious 
behavior does not have overly severe implications. See discussion infra Part VI.C. 
 21. See Sarah Jameson, Note, Cyberharassment: Striking a Balance Between Free Speech and 
Privacy, 17 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 231, 236 (2008) (―One problem that often arises with the 
definition of cyberharassment is the interchangeable and synonymous use of the terms 
‗cyberharassment,‘ ‗cyberstalking,‘ and ‗cyberbullying.‘ Although the terms are similar, each is subtly 
distinct.‖). 
 22. See, e.g., Ottenweller, supra note 16, at 1291 (―Cyberbullies are typically adolescent 
children, frequently in middle school, who direct hurtful and threatening comments at other 
adolescents over the Internet.‖); Servance, supra note 16, at 1218. 
 23. Ruedy, supra note 15, at 326. 
 24. Id. at 328 (defining cyberbullying as something which ―can occur anywhere and by anyone, 
regardless of age‖) (emphasis added).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss2/5
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minor, but leaves open the possibility that the victim could be an adult, 
such as a teacher.
25
  
The latter two uses of the term cyberbullying both contemplate the 
possibility that one party may not be a minor. These definitions overlap 
with what other commentators deem either cyberharassment or 
cyberstalking—terms that tend to be used in conjunction with adult 
behavior.
26
 Furthermore, even though cyberstalking and cyberharassment 
typically pertain to adults, they may be used to reference situations 
involving cyber victimization in a school setting.
27
 The overlap between 
these terms and cyberbullying can similarly be seen with respect to the 
degrees of harm inflicted by the culprit. According to the United States 
Department of Homeland Security‘s website for the United States 
Computer Emergency Readiness Team, schools are common problem 
areas, but cyberbullying ―can affect any age group‖ and the actions at 
issue ―can range in severity from cruel or embarrassing rumors to threats, 
harassment, or stalking.‖ 28 
In addition to overlapping with cyberbullying, cyberharassment and 
cyberstalking can be largely indistinguishable from one another. For 
example, one commentator states that cyberstalking is distinct from 
cyberbullying because cyberstalking involves credible threats.
29
 Another 
commentator states that cyberstalking includes the use of ―electronic 
communication to stalk or harass another individual,‖30 suggesting that 
cyberstalking is not independent of cyberharassment
31
 and need not 
involve credible threats. 
One commentator uses the phrase ―cyber targeting‖ because it ―both 
reflects more accurately what is going on and indicates that it can include 
many potential legal causes of action.‖ The advent of this unique phrase 
 
 
 25. See Todd D. Erb, Comment, A Case For Strengthening School District Jurisdiction to Punish 
Off-Campus Incidents of Cyberbullying, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 257, 259 (2008) (―Cyberbullying is not just 
limited to students: teachers and administrators are also targeted by cyberbullies.‖); see also Jameson, 
supra note 21, at 237 (―cyberbullying often refers to cyberharassment committed by children) 
(emphasis added). 
 26. See, e.g., Servance, supra note 16, at 1219 (―The term ‗cyber-harassment,‘ as used in this 
Comment, denotes the targeting of adult members of the school community on the Internet.‖). 
 27. See Goodno, supra note 18, at 138 (―The cyberstalker was a fellow student . . . .‖). 
 28. Mindi McDowell, United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team, National Cyber 
Alert System, Cyber Security Tip ST06-005, Dealing with Cyberbullies, http://www.us-cert.gov/cas/ 
tips/ST06-005.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2009). 
 29. Ruedy, supra note 15, at 326–27. 
 30. Goodno, supra note 18, at 126 (emphasis added). 
 31. Id. at 143. Here Goodno does note that some states have ―harassment‖ laws and others have 
―stalking‖ laws; however, for the purpose of her article, she appears to encompass both of them in the 
internet context under only the single term cyberstalking. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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highlights that using the more well-known terms for cyber victimization is 
difficult because the intended meanings of those terms may not be 
immediately apparent.
32
 The discrepancies between the uses of these three 
terms in academic literature are similarly reflected in the inconsistencies 
amongst state laws dealing with cyber victimization.
33
 However, before 
examining the range of state statutes, a discussion of the risks posed by 
cyber victimization is merited.  
III. WHY ALL FORMS OF CYBER VICTIMIZATION INVOLVE ENHANCED 
RISK  
The internet‘s unique characteristics enhance the risks associated with 
all forms of victimizing communications in two related ways: First, they 
make cyber victimization more prevalent than victimization in the physical 
world. Second, they amplify the dangerous effects of such 
communications upon the victim.
34
 Stalking and harassing speech are 
already commonly understood as criminal acts in the non-internet world. 
Like harassing and stalking speech, however, bullying speech is also more 
damaging when it is communicated over the internet.
 35
 As such, speech 
intending a lesser degree of harm, such as humiliation, should not be 
overlooked in the internet context, even though these types of 
communications may implicate young adults. Indeed, even in the non-
internet context ―[b]ullying manifests a wide range of emotional harm, 
from low self-esteem, anxiety, and depression to social withdrawal.‖36 A 
2006 news article highlights the fact that these manifestations are a reality 
of cyberbullying as well, reporting that ―[e]xperts and news reports 
worldwide tell disturbing tales of students harassed via the computer to the 
 
 
 32. David A. Myers, Defamation and the Quiescent Anarchy of the Internet: A Case Study of 
Cyber Targeting, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 667, 668 (2006). 
 33. Jameson, supra note 21, at 237 (―Many state laws that address cyberharassment, 
cyberstalking, and cyberbullying combine the three types of cybercrimes in their statutory schemes.‖). 
 34. See infra notes 38–58 and accompanying text. 
 35. Ottenweller, supra note 16, at 1294 (―There are several reasons that cyberbullying on the 
Internet is arguably more damaging to children than typical schoolyard bullying.‖); see also Ruedy, 
supra note 15, at 328 (―Cyberbullying has the potential to have a far greater impact than traditional 
bullying because of the public nature of the Internet and the ease of distribution of information.‖).  
 36. Servance, supra note 16, at 1216; see also Berin Szoka & Adam Thierer, Cyberbullying 
Legislation: Why Education is Preferable to Regulation, PROGRESS ON POINT June 2009, at 4, 
available at http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/2009/pop16.12-cyberbullying-education-better-than-
regulation.pdf (pointing to incidents of suicides by minors who were victims of anti-gay bullying in 
their schools, and noting that ―[i]n a recent review of studies of bullying and suicide [by] researchers at 
the Yale School of Medicine . . . [a]lmost all of the studies found connections between being bullied 
and suicide.‖). 
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point that they've left school or become severely depressed. A teenager in 
New Zealand recently committed suicide after being inundated with 
dozens of harassing and insulting text messages.‖37 The reasons for the 
enhanced risks associated with internet victimization apply, therefore, 
regardless of whether the parties involved are minors or adults. 
To begin, one dangerous aspect of the internet is that it provides people 
with the ability to reach a vastly broader audience than ever before.
38
 As a 
result, individuals are ―no longer constrained by the volume of their 
voice‖39 when they send harmful messages over the internet, making it 
easier for the culprit to reach his victim, and likewise, more difficult for 
the victim to simply avoid his harasser.
40
 The internet also allows these 
culprits to repeatedly victimize others with as little as the click of a button, 
requiring vastly less effort of stalkers, harassers, or bullies than in an off-
line context.
41
 Moreover, when damaging speech is posted on a website, 
the harm to the victim is public and constant, ―which compounds the 
invasion of privacy and ultimately the impact . . . .‖42 The potential for 
humiliating online messages to be widely dispersed public knowledge is 
equally, if not more, daunting for young people, who tend to spend large 
quantities of their free time online as extensions of their social 
interactions.
43
 
Another uniquely problematic feature of the internet is the fact that, 
when an occurrence sparks one‘s desire to communicate language meant 
to threaten, distress, or humiliate an individual, the internet diminishes any 
need for delay in carrying out that communication.
44
 This in turn 
eliminates the likelihood that the individual will think about the effects of 
 
 
 37. Tim Grant, Bullies Take Intimidation To Cyberspace, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, June 26, 
2006, http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/06177/701250-51.stm. 
 38. Scott Hammack, Note, The Internet Loophole: Why Threatening Speech On-Line Requires a 
Modification of the Courts’ Approach to True Threats and Incitement, 36 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 
65, 81–83 (2002). Hammack also distinguishes that, unlike the broad audience that people can send 
hurtful language to through other mediums, like television or books, ―the on-line audience is . . . 
widely scattered, making it very difficult to identify and track down.‖ Id. at 82. 
 39. Id. at 81. 
 40. Goodno, supra note 18, at 129 (―Cyberstalkers . . . can use the Internet to terrify their victims 
no matter where they are; thus, they simply cannot escape.‖). 
 41. Id. at 129 (comparing harassment over the phone, in which case ―every telephone call is a 
single event that requires the stalker‘s action and time‖ with harassment via an ―e-mail bomb,‖ which 
only requires a harasser to draft a single e-mail, at which point the computer can be programmed to 
send it to the victim repeatedly).  
 42. Id. 
 43. See Collins, supra note 9 (explaining that for teenagers, social websites can serve as ―a sort 
of popularity ledger‖ and describing that a teens‘ internet social life can be ―more mercurial, and 
perhaps more crucial to their sense of status and acceptance, than the one they inhabited in the flesh‖). 
 44. Hammack, supra note 38, at 83. 
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his words and decide not to go through with the planned speech.
45
 Instead, 
harmful language can be transmitted over the internet ―in a fit of rage,‖ 
and if the language is posted publicly in cyberspace it may be ―impossible 
to delete and may continue to incite readers long after the speaker has 
moderated her position.‖46 When harassing or bullying communications 
are at issue, the internet‘s instant nature may also encourage victims to 
lash out by acting in a harassing or bullying manner themselves, thus 
contributing to the cycle of victimization.
47
  
Another aspect of the internet that increases the risk of cyber 
victimization is the ease with which a culprit may anonymously post 
harmful messages without repercussions. Since the internet provides 
speakers with ―unprecedented anonymity,‖ it ―eliminates the social checks 
of ostracism and condemnation.‖48 Additionally, anonymity makes it 
easier for the perpetrator to overcome personal inhibitions that might have 
deterred him from carrying out the victimizing behavior if he were 
confronting his victim face-to-face.
49
 It is also less likely that the culprit 
will put an end to the harmful behavior because ―reactions such as crying, 
which might lead people to realize that their comments have been carried 
too far or misinterpreted, are no longer visible.‖50 Since the internet shields 
bullies from obtaining knowledge about the effects of their behavior, they 
can convince themselves that they are simply having fun when they annoy 
or humiliate their victims and, thus, justify continuing their behavior.
51
 
The internet‘s anonymity not only eases one‘s ability to victimize another 
individual, but also enhances the damaging effects on those who receive 
the victimizing messages. When speech communicated online involves 
more serious language, like threats, the anonymous delivery heightens the 
fear instilled in the victim, because ―[w]hen a threat comes from an 
unknown source, the victim is unable to assess the threat accurately.‖52 
 
 
 45. Id. (―As a result, the immediacy of the speech makes it more likely that lawless action will 
ensue.‖). 
 46. Id. 
 47. See Ruedy, supra note 15, at 329 (explaining that, according to a recent study, seven percent 
of middle school students who had been cyberbullied ―had served as both the bully and the victim on 
different occasions‖ (citing AMANDA LENHART ET AL., PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, TEENS 
AND TECHNOLOGY: YOUTH ARE LEADING THE TRANSITION TO A FULLY WIRED MOBILE NATION 
(2005), http://www.pewInternet.org/pdfs/PIP_Teens_Tech _July2005web.pdf (on file with the North 
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology))). 
 48. Hammack, supra note 38, at 83. 
 49. Goodno, supra note 18, at 130.  
 50. Robin M. Kowalski & Susan Limber, Electronic Bullying Among Middle School Students, 41 
J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH S22, S23 (2007). 
 51. Kowalski, supra note 50, at S28. 
 52. Hammack, supra note 38, at 84. In order to exemplify the effect that anonymity can have on 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss2/5
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Likewise, the anonymity possible with cyberbullying can ―leave a child 
wondering if each person he or she meets was potentially the 
perpetrator.‖53 Regardless of age, the victim may be helpless to determine 
who or how many people are sending the message, leaving him uncertain 
of whether the message is meant to be taken seriously or whether any 
threats made are capable of being carried out.
54
  
Finally, one of the most daunting aspects of internet victimization is the 
culprit‘s ability to take on the victim‘s identity.55 By assuming the victim‘s 
identity, the culprit may cause third parties to become accomplices in the 
crime.
56
 The incitement of third parties can be overt.
57
 However, such 
incitement can also involve innocent third parties, which is often linked to 
the culprit‘s deceptive use of the victim‘s identity. For example, one 
individual harassed his victim by ―impersonating her in various Internet 
chat rooms and posting her telephone number, address, and messages that 
she fantasized of being raped. Because of these messages, on separate 
occasions, at least six men knocked on the woman‘s door saying they 
wanted to rape her.‖58 Without the internet‘s unprecedented anonymity 
and vast audience both at work, one can imagine how difficult it would be 
for a person to harass his victim by pretending to be her and inviting the 
involvement of unknowing third parties. Ultimately, the myriad of risks 
posed by the internet as a mode of stalking, harassing, and bullying 
 
 
someone who is threatened, Hammack notes that if a disagreeable child threatens to shoot a neighbor 
with a BB gun, the neighbor can easily take appropriate actions such as calling the child‘s parents, 
avoiding him, or confronting him. However, if the same child sends the neighbor an anonymous email 
threatening to injure her, she has no means with which to counter the threat and no method for 
establishing its veracity. Id. 
 53. Kowalski, supra note 50, at S28. 
 54. Hammack, supra note 38, at 84.  
 55. Goodno, supra note 18, at 131. As an example of a cyberstalker taking on the identity of his 
victim, Goodno tells the story of Jane Hitchcock. 
[Mrs. Hitchcock] was cyberstalked by the owner of a company after she complained about the 
company‘s services. Intending to provoke others, the cyberstalker impersonated Hitchock and 
posted inflammatory comments on Web pages and sent e-mails in her name aimed at 
provoking others to ―flame‖ her. . . . He would also send thousands of harassing messages to 
her husband‘s and her employer‘s e-mail accounts, sometimes impersonating Hitchcock, 
which eventually flooded the accounts rendering them ‗useless.‘ The cyberstalker‘s actions 
became so unbearable that Hitchock was forced to physically move, but that did not stop him. 
He eventually found her online and would begin to harass her again. Hitchock sued him, but 
the cyberstalker was never held criminally liable. 
Id. (citing J.A. HITCHCOCK, NET CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS: OUTMANEUVERING THE SPAMMERS, 
SWINDLERS, AND STALKERS WHO ARE TARGETING YOU ONLINE 11 (Loraine Page ed., 2002)). 
 56. Goodno, supra note 18, at 132. 
 57. Hammack, supra note 38, at 82 (―Through email, discussion boards, and instant messaging, 
the Internet also facilitates the creation of networks of like-minded persons to help carry out threats.‖).  
 58. Goodno, supra note 18, at 132. 
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individuals necessitates careful consideration of how state laws account 
for internet-victimization crimes.  
IV. THE SPECTRUM OF STATE LAWS 
There has been nearly nationwide acknowledgement of the role that 
electronic communication can play in harming others. This 
acknowledgement is evidenced by the fact that most states have updated 
their laws to account for at least one form of cyber victimization.
59
 
However, a range of shortcomings still exist: First, three states still do not 
have laws which plainly address any form of cyber victimization. 
Additionally, many states account for the use of computers and the 
internet for one crime, but fall short of fully covering all potential forms of 
cyber victimization. Finally, a third category involves states with laws that 
conflate various types of harm into a single, overly inclusive statute. 
A. States That Do Not Explicitly Criminalize Any Form of Cyber 
Victimization 
As of this writing, there are only three states remaining with laws that 
do not plainly account for internet victimization of any kind: Nebraska,
60
 
New Jersey,
61
 and New Mexico.
62
 Each of these states has stalking and 
harassment laws which use broad definitions that include 
―communication‖ as a mode of carrying out the relevant crimes. However, 
these laws do not explicitly include the use of computers or electronic 
communications as a means of victimization. 
Nebraska‘s stalking and harassment statute, for example, defines 
―course of conduct‖ for the purposes of these crimes as ―a pattern of 
conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, 
evidencing a continuity of purpose, including a series of acts of following, 
detaining, restraining the personal liberty of, or stalking the person or 
telephoning, contacting, or otherwise communicating with the person.‖63 
This definition omits any reference to the internet. As such, the statute 
 
 
 59. See National Conference of State Legislatures, State Electronic Harassment or 
―Cyberstalking‖ Laws, http://www.ncsl.org/IssuesResearch/TelecommunicationsInformationTechno 
logy/CyberstalkingLaws/tabid/13495/Default.aspx (last visited Aug. 3, 2009) (listing states that 
―explicitly include electronic forms of communication within stalking or harassment laws‖).  
 60. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-311.02 (2008) (stalking and harassment).  
 61. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:12-10 (West 2005) (stalking), § 2C:33-4 (harassment). 
 62. Harassment and Stalking Act, S.B. 166 (N.M. 2009) (enacted).  
 63. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-311.02(2)(b) (2005). 
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leaves open the possibility for a culprit to, for example, post humiliating 
forms of communication on a website without potential criminal 
repercussions, since such posts may be construed as communications that 
are not directed at the individual.  
Similarly, New Jersey‘s stalking and harassment statutes refer to 
―communications,‖ but they do not directly reference the possibility that 
such communication will be transmitted over the internet.
64
 There is, 
however, legislation pending in New Jersey which seeks to include 
broader forms of victimizing behavior that are made possible by the 
internet. Specifically, the legislation proposes to add the following 
language to the state‘s harassment law:  
 A person commits a crime of the fourth degree if, in committing 
an offense under this section, he makes or causes to be made a 
communication or communications in violation of this section by 
electronic means, to persons other than the victim or in such manner 
that persons other than the victim may readily observe the 
communication or communications.
65
 
This language would account for communications like website posts, 
which, as explained earlier in this section, are not easily encompassed by 
anti-victimization laws without reference to the internet. The legislation 
proposes to further amend the harassment statute by criminalizing 
communication ―which exposes or publicizes any secret or any asserted 
fact, whether true or false, tending to subject another person to hatred, 
contempt or ridicule,‖ and any course of conduct which is carried out with 
the purpose to ―embarrass‖ or ―humiliate‖ an individual.66 If revised 
accordingly, New Jersey‘s harassment law would, therefore, more broadly 
account for bullying types of behaviors as well. This bill was introduced in 
the New Jersey Senate on March 9, 2009 and, as of this writing, has been 
referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee.
67
 
New Mexico also currently has laws that define ―pattern of conduct‖ 
without reference to electronic communications.
68
 Like New Jersey, New 
Mexico had legislation pending that proposed to amend the harassment 
 
 
 64. See supra note 61. 
 65. S. 2704, 213th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2008). 
 66. Id. 
 67. New Jersey Legislature, http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2010) (input bill 
number in ―Bill Search‖ section; then select ―Search‖). 
 68. See supra note 62. 
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law to include such a reference.
69
 However, as of this writing, action on 
that bill has been ―postponed indefinitely.‖70 
B. Problematic Aspects of Other States’ Laws 
While the vast majority of states have already worked to include cyber 
victimization in their criminal codes—either by creating new cyber 
statutes or by updating established stalking and harassment laws to cover 
acts carried out over the internet
71—many of them have only addressed a 
single form of cyber victimization, and still others have seemingly 
criminalized multiple forms in one overly inclusive law. 
Arizona is one such state that has addressed only a single form of cyber 
victimization. Under Arizona‘s harassment law, an individual who 
―[a]nonymously or otherwise contacts, communicates or causes a 
communication with another person by verbal, electronic, mechanical, 
telegraphic, telephonic or written means in a manner that harasses,‖ 
commits a misdemeanor.
72
 However, Arizona‘s stalking statute, which 
accounts for more severe behavior that causes a person to fear for his 
safety or life, does not directly include internet communications.
73
 
Therefore, if a culprit in Arizona stalks a person over the internet to the 
point of inflicting the requisite fear upon his victim, it may be difficult to 
convict the perpetrator of the felony crime. 
Other states have grouped crimes involving various degrees of intent 
into a single, overly inclusive statute. Louisiana, for example, has a 
cyberstalking statute which criminalizes language communicated 
electronically ―for the purpose of threatening, terrifying, or harassing any 
person.‖74 This law imposes a fine of up to $2,000, up to 1 year in jail, or 
 
 
 69. S.B. 494, 49th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2009) (proposing to add the language ―by any means, 
including an electronic communication device‖ to the harassment statue). 
 70. See New Mexico Legislature, SB 494 http://www.nmlegis.gov/lcs/_session. aspx?Chamber= 
S&LegType=B&LegNo=494&year=09 (stating that the bill‘s current location is ―Died (API. [action 
postponed indefinitely])‖).  
 71. See Goodno, supra note 18, at 144–45. 
 72. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2921(A)(1) (2008) (emphasis added). 
 73. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2923 (2008). 
 74. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.3 (2007) (emphasis added). The statute‘s full definition 
explains: 
 B. Cyberstalking is action of any person to accomplish any of the following: 
 (1) Use in electronic mail or electronic communication of any words or language 
threatening to inflict bodily harm to any person or to such person‘s child, sibling, spouse, or 
dependent, or physical injury to the property of any person, or for the purpose of extorting 
money or other things of value from any person. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss2/5
  
 
 
 
 
2009] CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR INTERNET CULPRITS 419 
 
 
 
 
both for an initial offense, with increased fines and jail times possible for 
repeated offenses.
75
 Kentucky serves as another example because, while it 
has a distinct law accounting for cyberstalking,
76
 the state‘s harassing 
communications law appears to conflate cyberharassment and 
cyberbullying into a single law.
77
 This statute first imposes criminal 
liability on an individual who, ―with intent to intimidate, harass, annoy, or 
alarm another person,‖ uses any form of written communication ―in a 
manner which causes annoyance or alarm and serves no purpose of 
legitimate communication.‖78 The statute then imposes the same degree of 
criminal liability on an individual who 
[c]ommunicates, while enrolled as a student in a local school 
district, with or about another school student, anonymously or 
otherwise, by telephone, the Internet, telegraph, mail, or any other 
form of electronic or written communication in a manner which a 
reasonable person under the circumstances should know would 
cause the other student to suffer fear of physical harm, intimidation, 
humiliation, or embarrassment and which serves no purpose of 
legitimate communication.
79
 
Although many states have successfully taken affirmative steps to 
implement laws covering cyber victimization, others have fallen short. 
States that have amended their laws ineffectively, either by leaving them 
incomplete or making them overly inclusive, and states which have not 
amended their laws to include the internet at all should update their 
criminal codes to cover the full spectrum of cyber victimization. 
 
 
 (2) Electronically mail or electronically communicate to another repeatedly, whether or 
not conversation ensues, for the purpose of threatening, terrifying, or harassing any person. 
 (3) Electronically mail or electronically communicate to another and to knowingly make 
any false statement concerning death, injury, illness, disfigurement, indecent conduct, or 
criminal conduct of the person electronically mailed or of any member of the person‘s family 
or household with the intent to threaten, terrify, or harass. 
 (4) Knowingly permit an electronic communication device under the person's control to 
be used for the taking of an action in Paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of this Subsection. 
Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. H.B. 315 (Ky. 2009) (enacted) (amending stalking law to include the use of communication 
devices, such as computers and the internet, as a means by which the crime may be committed). 
 77. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 525.080 (West 2009). 
 78. Id. § 525.080(1). 
 79. Id. § 525.080(1)(c). 
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V. WHY STATE LAWS SHOULD BE UPDATED TO ACCOUNT FOR ALL 
FORMS OF CYBER VICTIMIZATION  
While the law has since been amended,
80
 Missouri‘s outdated 
harassment law prior to Megan Meier‘s death simply did not account for 
the circumstances of Drew‘s actions. Since Missouri legislators had not 
originally accounted for the unique modes of victimization made possible 
by the internet when they drafted the state‘s relevant criminal statutes, law 
enforcement authorities were powerless take any action against Drew or 
the other individuals responsible for harassing Megan Meier on the 
internet.
81
 The aftermath of the Megan Meier incident demonstrates 
various reasons why states that have not done so already should impose 
criminal liability for acts of cyber victimization, and why states that have 
taken initial steps to expand their laws in this area should continue to do so 
in order to ensure complete coverage of cyber victimization. 
This part first explores the pervasive and heightened effects of internet 
victimization that pose a problem of growing signficance. Next, this part 
explains the risk of over-criminalization resulting from attempts to hold 
internet victimizers legally responsible when no law on point exists. 
Finally, this part addresses the lack of other legal safeguards to serve as 
alternate remedies for individuals who are victimized online. Thus, when 
 
 
 80. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.090 (2009), amended by S.B. 818, 94th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. 
(Mo. 2008). The amended version of Missouri‘s harassment statute reads: 
1. A person commits the crime of harassment if he or she: 
 (1) Knowingly communicates a threat to commit any felony to another person and in so 
doing, frightens, intimidates, or causes emotional distress to such other person; or 
 (2) When communicating with another person, knowingly uses coarse language offensive 
to one of average sensibility and thereby puts such person in reasonable apprehension of 
offensive physical contact or harm; or 
 (3) Knowingly frightens, intimidates, or causes emotional distress to another person by 
anonymously making a telephone call or any electronic communication; or 
 (4) Knowingly communicates with another person who is, or who purports to be, 
seventeen years of age or younger and in so doing and without good cause recklessly 
frightens, intimidates, or causes emotional distress to such other person; or 
 (5) Knowingly makes repeated unwanted communication to another person; or 
 (6) Without good cause engages in any other act with the purpose to frighten, intimidate, 
or cause emotional distress to another person, cause such person to be frightened, intimidated, 
or emotionally distressed, and such person‘s response to the act is one of a person of average 
sensibilities considering the age of such person. 
Id. 
 81. Maag, supra note 1. According to Lieutenant Craig McGuire of the St. Charles County 
Sheriff‘s Department, Drew‘s conduct ―might‘ve been rude, it might‘ve been immature, but it wasn‘t 
illegal.‖ Id. The original statute specified how the harassing communication must be carried out, with 
no specific reference to the possibility of electronic communication. See supra note 80. 
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viewed as a whole, the factors explored in this part explain why states 
should update their laws to account for all potential forms of internet 
victimization. 
A. Evidence of the Serious and Widely Felt Effects of Internet 
Victimization 
Statistical evidence demonstrates that a significant portion of young 
people and adults alike have suffered from internet victimization at some 
point in their lives. The National Crime Prevention Council released 
information in 2007 stating that, in that year, forty-three percent of 
teenagers had been targeted by cyberbullies.
82
 In fact, according to some 
commentators, ―academic research suggests that peer-on-peer 
cyberbullying is a more significant online safety concern than child 
predation—and that this problem is growing,‖ as evidenced by various 
teen suicides that have resulted from acts of cyberbullying.
83
 Similarly, a 
1999 Department of Justice report suggested that that the number of yearly 
cyberstalking incidents might be in the ―tens of thousands.‖84 The fact that 
these statistics reflect a grave potential for harm to the victims involved is 
evident by the correlating responses of legislators,
85
 website creators,
86
 and 
the general public.
87
 
First, recent bills calling for education and prevention of internet 
victimization indicate that both national and state legislatures are in fact 
recognizing the realities about the prevalence of this problem in the 
modern age.
88
 For example, on May 14, 2008, the Internet Crime 
Prevention Act was introduced in the United States Senate proposing that 
the Attorney General shall be directed to provide ―grants for Internet crime 
prevention education programs.‖89 Similarly, on May 22, 2008, the 
 
 
 82. National Crime Prevention Council, Stop Cyberbullying Before it Starts, http://www.ncpc. 
org/topics/by-audience/parents/bullying/cyberbullying/cyberbullying.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2010). 
 83. Szoka, supra note 36, at 4. 
 84. Goodno, supra note 18, at 126. 
 85. See infra notes 88–93 and accompanying text. 
 86. See infra notes 94–99 and accompanying text. 
 87. See infra notes 100–04 and accompanying text. 
 88. Szoka, supra note 36, at 2 (―In the 110th session of Congress, for example, more than 30 
measures were introduced aimed at addressing child safety concerns in one way or another, although 
only a few of them passed into law.‖). 
 89. Internet Crime Prevention Act of 2008, S. 3016, 110th Cong. § 2 (2008). Section 2(c)(2) 
states that ―[t]he term ‗Internet crime prevention education program‘ means a program that serves to 
educate parents, children, educators, and communities about how to recognize and prevent potentially 
criminal activity on the Internet.‖ Id. Section 2(c)(3) states that ―[t]he term ‗potentially criminally 
activity‘ includes access through the Internet and other electronic devices to potentially illegal activity 
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Protecting Our Children Online Act was introduced in the United States 
House of Representatives, proposing that the Communications Act of 
1934 be amended to ensure that certain schools and libraries begin 
―educating minors about safe online behavior.‖90 An Illinois statute 
exemplifies that states are also going to greater lengths to account for the 
increasing need for protection online.
91
 Beginning in the 2009–2010 
school year, Illinois law effectively mandates that an internet safety 
component be incorporated for children in or above third grade.
92
 This 
modified version is distinct from the former law‘s mere suggestion that 
schools incorporate such a component into their curriculum.
93
  
Legislative recognition of the serious nature of modern internet 
victimization problems mirrors the response of website creators and the 
general public. The ―MySpace‖ website‘s home page,94 for example, 
offers users a page dedicated to providing information on safety,
95
 which 
is broken down into categories such as safety tips ―for parents and 
educators‖96 and safety tips ―for teens.‖97 Aside from safety information 
being incorporated into pre-existing social networking sites, the creation 
of various new websites for the purpose of calling attention to these issues 
is indicative of the public‘s growing awareness and concern. Such 
websites cover a broad spectrum. For example, two individuals with PhDs 
in criminal justice created the website cyberbullying.us to serve as ―a 
central repository and information clearinghouse for the phenomenon of 
cyberbullying.‖98 Another website, cyberstalked.org, was created by a 
 
 
including sexual or racial harassment, cyberbullying, sexual exploitation, exposure to pornography, 
and privacy violations.‖ Id. 
 90. Protecting Our Children Online Act, H.R. 6145, 110th Cong. (2008). Sections 2(a)(3)(b), (i) 
and (ii) state that education about internet behavior ―may include information about—interacting with 
other individuals through social networking websites, chat rooms, electronic mail, bulletin boards, 
instant messaging, and other means of online communication; and cyberbullying awareness and 
response.‖ Id. 
 91. 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/27-13.3 (West Supp. 2009). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. Section (c) replaced the former text, ―[i]t is hereby recommended that the curriculum 
provide for a minimum of 2 hours of Internet safety education each school year,‖ with language that 
orders, ―a school district must incorporate into the school curriculum a component on Internet safety to 
be taught at least once each school year to students in grade 3 or above.‖ See S.B. 2512, 95th Gen. 
Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2008). 
 94. MySpace Home Page, http://www.myspace.com (last visited Jan. 6, 2010). 
 95. Id. (follow ―Safety‖ hyperlink). 
 96. Id. (follow ―for parents & educators‖ hyperlink). 
 97. Id. (follow ―for teens‖ hyperlink). This page also has a specific section dedicated to 
cyberbullying, with instructions on what to do if you are being victimized, and resources for teens who 
do not feel comfortable going to an adult for help. Id. (follow ―Cyberbullying‖ hyperlink). 
 98. Cyberbullying Research Center, http://www.cyberbullying.us/aboutus.php (last visited Jan. 
18, 2009). 
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former victim of cyberstalking to expose the injustices done by the internet 
culprit who preyed upon her, and to educate others.
99
  
Finally, the public outcry regarding the lack of criminal liability 
originally imposed against Drew after the Megan Meier incident indicates 
the need for appropriate criminal laws punishing internet abuses against 
others.
100
 In one of her articles, Kim Zetter points out the tendency for the 
cycle of internet victimization to be perpetuated when the legal system 
fails to impose criminal liability for abusive acts online.
101
 Specifically, 
Zetter discusses Sarah Wells who, upon learning about the aftermath of 
the Meier incident, ―resolved to take matters into her own hands.‖102 
Wells‘ actions demonstrate that people have an instinctive desire to punish 
internet culprits with a taste of their own medicine when the law is 
helpless to impose justice.
103
 According to Zetter, after Wells tracked 
down Lori Drew‘s identity and posted the woman‘s name on her personal 
blog,  
her readers and other bloggers followed by finding and posting her 
husband's name, the family‘s address and phone number, a 
cellphone number, the name of the family‘s advertising company, 
and the names and phone numbers of clients with whom they 
worked . . .  
 . . . .  
 In retaliation, readers called Drew‘s advertising clients to urge 
them to withdraw their business from her. But it wasn‘t long before 
 
 
 99. http://www.cyberstalked.org/ourstory/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2009) [hereinafter Cyberstalked 
Website]; see also www.cyberangels.org (follow ―About Us‖ hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 18, 2009) 
(―In response to citizens‘ calls for assistance in dealing with online threats, the Guardian Angels 
launched CyberAngels in 1995. Today CyberAngels is one of the oldest and most respected online 
safety education programs in the world.‖); www.bullypolice. org (last visited Jan. 18, 2009) (―A 
Watch-dog Organization—Advocating for Bullied Children & Reporting on State Anti Bullying 
Laws‖). 
 100. Collins, supra note 9 (stating that ―public opinion against the Drews had been harsh, verging 
on violent,‖ and describing that ―Pam Fogarty, the mayor [of Dardenne Prairie], had two hundred 
unanswered e-mails in her in-box. ‗People are shocked, and they‘re pissed as hell!‘‖). 
 101. See Kim Zetter, Cyberbullying Suicide Stokes the Internet Fury Machine, WIRED, Nov. 21, 
2007, http://www. wired.com/politics/onlinerights/news/2007/11/vigilante_justice. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. (―The impulse is human nature, say experts, and few can imagine an offense more 
egregious than a trusted adult preying on the emotions of a vulnerable child. Shunning wrongdoers, 
especially in the absence of legal redress, helps maintain order and preserve a community‘s moral 
sense of right . . . .‖). 
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there were death threats, a brick through a window and calls to set 
the Drews‘ house on fire.104 
Thus, statistics regarding the prevalence of internet victimization are 
bolstered by the actions that legislators, website creators, and members of 
the general public have taken in recognition of the serious nature of this 
growing problem. 
B. The Risk of Over-Criminalization When No Law On Point Exists  
In addition to catching the public‘s attention, the lack of legal avenues 
available in Missouri to prosecute Drew for her behavior toward Megan 
Meier caught the attention of federal prosecutors.
105
 Drew was indicted in 
Los Angeles, where MySpace is based, in February of 2008.
106
 The 
indictment included one charge of conspiracy and three other charges 
relating to violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,
107
 which was 
originally intended to criminalize hacking.
108
 Specifically, ―[t]he 
indictment allege[d] that Drew and her co-conspirators violated MySpace's 
terms of service, which require registrants to provide truthful registration 
information and refrain from soliciting personal information from anyone 
under 18 or using information obtained from MySpace services to harass 
or harm other people, among other terms.‖109 In November of 2008, a jury 
found Drew guilty of ―three misdemeanor offenses of accessing computers 
without authorization.‖110 Recently, however, Drew was acquitted of those 
charges based on ―the absence of minimal guidelines to govern law 
enforcement,‖ and ―actual notice deficiencies‖ in the applicable statute.111  
 
 
 104. Id. 
 105. See Kim Zetter, Lori Drew Indicted in MySpace Suicide Case—Updated, WIRED, May 15, 
2008, http://blog. wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/05/lori-drew-indic.html [hereinafter Zetter, Indicted]. 
 106. Grossman, supra note 5, at 3–4. 
 107. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000). 
 108. Grossman, supra note 5, at 4. Criminal hacking is defined as ―the surreptitious breaking ‗into 
the computer, network, servers, or database of another person or organization.‘‖ See Charlotte Decker, 
Cyber Crime 2.0: An Argument To Update The United States Criminal Code To Reflect The Changing 
Nature Of Cyber Crime, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 959, 965 (2008) (quoting BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 730 
(8th ed. 2004)). 
 109. Zetter, Indictment, supra note 105. 
 110. See Conviction on Lesser Charges in MySpace Case, MSNBC, Nov. 26, 2008, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/27928608?GT1=43001 (last visited Oct. 18, 2009) [hereinafter Lesser 
Charges] (―The federal jury could not reach a verdict on the main charge against 49-year-old Lori 
Drew—conspiracy—and rejected three other felony counts of accessing computers without 
authorization to inflict emotional harm.‖). 
 111. United States v. Drew, No. CR 08-0582-GW, 2009 WL 2872855, at *14 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 
2009). 
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Andrew Grossman, of the Heritage Foundation, joined with other 
groups
112
 in criticizing the charges brought against Drew, claiming they 
were a classic example of over-criminalization.
113
 Grossman opined that, 
―[w]hatever Drew intended to do, hacking MySpace was not it.‖114 He 
expressed concern that social networks‘ terms of service are too vague to 
be the basis of criminal liability when violated, and that under the 
prosecution‘s theory of Drew‘s criminal liability, countless numbers of 
well-intentioned individuals could be subject to prosecution.
115
 The United 
States District Court for the Central District of California echoed these 
concerns in its decision.
116
 As an example of someone who could face 
criminal prosecution under the prosecution‘s application of the statute, the 
court pointed to ―the lonely-heart who submits intentionally inaccurate 
data about his or her age, height and/or physical appearance, which 
contravenes the [MySpace.com Terms of Use Agreement] prohibition 
against providing ‗information that you know is false or misleading.‘‖117 
While the court determined that ―basing a CFAA misdemeanor violation 
. . . upon the conscious violation of a website‘s terms of service runs afoul 
of the void-for-vagueness doctrine,‖ it appeared to leave open the 
possibility that such a conviction could be upheld if the statute‘s currently 
deficient notice and guidelines for law enforcement were appropriately 
revised.
118
 
Despite the fact that Drew was not successfully prosecuted under the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, her attempted prosecution under a statute 
that was arguably distantly related to her behavior demonstrates the need 
for states to enact statutes which will appropriately cover each type of 
 
 
 112. See, e.g., Robert McMillan, Group Says MySpace Cyber-bully Prosecution Goes Too Far, 
PC WORLD, May 19, 2008, http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/146069/group_says_ 
myspace_cyberbully_prosecution_goes_too_far.html (―[T]he Center for Democracy & Technology 
warned that the U.S. Department of Justice‘s action against Lori Drew . . . [went] too far by using an 
anti-hacking law to prosecute the O‘Fallon, Missouri, woman for violating MySpace‘s terms of 
service.‖). 
 113. See generally Grossman, supra note 5. According to Grossman, over-criminalization defines 
the result that occurs when a ―vague law‖ is ―twisted‖ to encompass some particular conduct that 
already took place, in turn ―expand[ing] [the law‘s] scope enormously.‖ Id. at 1. 
 114. Id. at 6; see also McMillan, supra note 112 (quoting Brock Meeks, a spokesman for the 
Center for Democracy & Technology, as saying: ―Everybody that is sympathetic to this case and 
saying finally we‘ve got something to nail her on here, they‘re not looking hard enough at the fact that 
the Justice Department blundered by using this anti-hacker law.‖). 
 115. Grossman, supra note 5, at 7–8. 
 116. See Drew, 2009 WL 2872855. 
 117. Id. at *16. 
 118. Id. at *14; see also id. at *16 (noting, for example, that the statute‘s relevant provision ―is not 
limited to instances where the website owner contacts law enforcement to complain about an 
individual‘s unauthorized access or exceeding permitted access on the site‖). 
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victimization possible in the internet context. In failing to address cyber 
victimization altogether, or in accounting for only some forms of the 
behavior, states leave open two possibilities: individuals will either 
successfully target their victims online without risking criminal liability, 
or they may face the potential to be charged with violating laws that do not 
truly pertain to their actions and intent.
119
 Neither outcome is desirable, 
and both serve as reasons that states should update their laws accordingly.  
C. The Lack of Other Legal Safeguards 
In addition to the serious effects of cyber victimization and the 
potential for these acts to be over-criminalized when no appropriate law 
exists, the lack of other legal safeguards provides an additional reason for 
states to impose criminal liability where it is currently lacking. First, while 
civil sanctions may present one option for victims of internet harassment 
to gain relief, civil remedies are not, standing alone, sufficient or 
appropriate to deal with internet victimization issues. One problem is that 
―[t]he primary civil remedy available for cruel and insulting speech is a 
defamation action, or one of its subsets—libel or slander.‖120 Internet 
harassment in one of its various forms has the potential to have serious 
negative effects on the victim, and yet not qualify under any of those 
causes of action.
121
 For example, in J.S. v. Bethlehem Area School 
District,
122
 a website created by one student and comments made on it by a 
number of other students, were so severely distressing to the targeted 
teacher that the teacher became mentally and physically ill and ultimately 
left the job.
123
 Despite these consequences for the teacher, however, ―the 
jury did not find the comments defamatory in nature.‖124 Additionally, as 
one commentator explains, when students are the victims hoping to bring 
civil actions,  
 
 
 119. See Derek Kravitz, ‘MySpace Suicide’ Case Expands Web Law, WASH. POST, Nov. 28, 2008, 
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/washingtonpostinvestigations/2008/11/myspace_suicide_ruling_a_w
ater.html?nav=rss_blog (―Phil Malone, director of the Cyberlaw Clinic at Harvard Law School, said 
that [the verdict against Drew] could have a chilling impact given that the ‗vast majority of Internet 
users do not read Web site terms of service carefully or at all.‘‖). 
 120. See Erb, supra note 25, at 276–77 (2008) (citation omitted). 
 121. See generally id. at 276–80. 
 122. 807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002). 
 123. Erb, supra note 25, at 278 (explaining that the website made about the teacher listed reasons 
why she should be fired, depicted her as Hitler, and called for students to lend money for the cause of 
helping to ―hire a hitman to kill her‖) (citing 807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002)). 
 124. Erb, supra note 25, at 278 (citation omitted). 
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an entirely new set of problems arises. In a libel action, for example, 
the accused can use the affirmative defense that the hurtful 
statements are true. In cases where the comments are sexually 
explicit, such as listing which girl on campus is the ―biggest ―ho‘‖ 
[sic] or which one performs the best oral sex, the civil nature of the 
case leaves open the unsavory possibility of a defense team setting 
out to prove that the student really was the ―biggest ho‖ in the 
school.
125
 
Furthermore, even if there is an applicable cause of action, the simple 
well-known fact that ―[c]ivil lawsuits are expensive‖126 will often prevent 
injured parties from bringing suit based on limited resources. As part of 
her story about being targeted by an internet stalker, Cynthia Armistead 
states: ―Legal advisors have since told me that there was more than 
enough evidence to obtain a civil judgment, but I did not have the 
resources to pursue a civil case . . . when the case was ‗fresh‘.‖127 
Armistead‘s perspective, as someone who has directly faced internet 
abuse, highlights the fact that costs and difficulties of maneuvering and 
understanding the legal system present hurdles that would impede many 
victims from pursuing civil redress. Without applicable criminal laws, 
therefore, such injured persons will probably never see their victimizer 
held accountable for his actions in a court of law. Additionally, while a 
civil action would potentially provide a victim with financial 
compensation, that victim‘s foremost priority will be ensuring that the 
culprit‘s behavior is put to an end. Accordingly, cyber victimization is 
better suited to prosecution under criminal law, which seeks to punish and 
deter wrongdoing, than liability under civil law, which seeks to make a 
person whole.
128
 
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act serves as another 
impediment to judicial relief, because it effectively prevents Internet 
Service Providers (ISPs) from being held civilly liable for the content that 
they passively publish over the internet.
129
 Accordingly, websites 
themselves rarely provide any type of safeguard to protect individuals 
 
 
 125. Id. at 279 (citation omitted). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Cyberstalked Website, supra note 99. 
 128. See, e.g., Wendy Gerwick Couture, White Collar Crime’s Gray Area: The Anomaly of 
Criminalizing Conduct Not Civilly Actionable, 72 ALB. L. REV. 1, 44 (2009) (―[S]cholars typically 
agree that the criminal law punishes and deters and that the civil law compensates.‖) (citation omitted). 
 129. 47 U.S.C.A. § 230 (2000). 
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targeted on the internet.
130
 In fact, ―[m]ost courts interpret the CDA as 
giving ISPs complete immunity from legal action for the postings of a 
third party even if the ISP is notified about the harassing material and fails 
to take action.‖131 The unfortunate result of this Communications Decency 
Act provision is, oftentimes, that no one is held responsible for the content 
that causes victims of internet abuse to suffer serious consequences.
132
 If 
no criminal liability exists for the individual internet harasser, this result is 
especially likely to be true. 
Finally, in the young adult context, it is important to recognize that 
schools are not fully capable of dealing with students who perpetrate 
internet abuse. In her article, Renee Servance notes some people‘s belief 
―that there is a strict line between on-and off-campus speech that removes 
school authority, with the underlying policy that schools have no right to 
usurp the role of parents.‖133 Students that victimize others online, outside 
of school, are arguably beyond schools‘ authority. Contrary to the limited 
authority that schools hold, criminal liability gives courts the right to go 
beyond parents and impose punishments when such is a necessary means 
of carrying out justice. Furthermore, while in-school education about 
cyberbullying would certainly aid in prevention, ―there is simply no 
substitute for parental oversight and mentoring,‖ something which often 
goes overlooked by parents who are ―[u]naccustomed to, or uncomfortable 
with modern computing or communication devices.‖134 If state statutes 
were to hold minors responsible for paying fines in the event that they 
intentionally cause harm to another individual over the internet, parents 
would be forced to take notice of their children‘s behavior and, most 
likely, would quickly become involved in monitoring and advising their 
children‘s online activities.  
 
 
 130. See Erb, supra note 25, at 279 (―[P]arents have had little success using the Communications 
Decency Act in convincing Internet service providers to shut down cyberbullying web sites.‖) (citation 
omitted). 
 131. Ottenweller, supra note 16, at 1287. 
 132. Myers, supra note 32, at 671 (―This controversial provision has resulted in rather broad 
immunity for ISPs, and may, in some cases, leave no one legally accountable for the injuries caused by 
anonymous postings on the Internet.‖). 
 133. Servance, supra note 16, at 1222. 
 134. Szoka, supra note 36, at 19. 
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VI. HOW STATE LAWS SHOULD BE UPDATED: PROPOSAL OF A THREE-
TIERED CLASSIFICATION FOR CYBER VICTIMIZATION CRIMES  
Since each of the various degrees of cyber victimization has grown 
increasingly pervasive, states should adopt a three-pronged classification 
of such crimes. This scheme would include cyberstalking, 
cyberharassment, and cyberbullying in order to account for the various 
degrees of intent with which culprits may act—harshly punishing those 
that are malicious, and imposing lesser penalties on those that are less 
grave—to drive home the point that victimizing behavior will not be 
tolerated in our society. The lack of clear distinctions between these three 
labels as they are currently used, however, mandates that new standards be 
established to distinguish between each crime. 
A. Consistent Elements Among All Three Cyber Crimes 
1. The Culprit’s Actus Reus 
First, the culprit‘s method of victimization, or rather, his actus reus, 
should have no bearing on which crime is attributed to him. Perpetrators 
can communicate threatening, harassing, or offensive language to their 
victims using various methods.
135
 All of the available methods that 
effectively victimize another individual over the internet should pertain to 
each of the types of cyber crimes alike. 
Next, the definitions of all cyber crimes should be drafted so they 
dispel with the problematic actus reus requirements, which currently 
render many non-cyber stalking and harassment statutes inapplicable in 
the internet context.
136
 Specifically, none of the crimes should require an 
element of proximity to the victim,
137
 nor should they include an ―overt‖ 
or ―credible‖ threat requirement.138  
 
 
 135. These methods of interference can include e-mails or instant messages sent directly to the 
victim, offensive blog entries or comments posted about the person, or the creation of entire web pages 
negatively targeting the individual. See Ottenweller, supra note 16, at 1290. 
 136. See Goodno, supra note 18, at 134–39. 
 137. A proximity requirement would make it too problematic to impose liability on individuals 
who victimize their targets online because the fact that the crimes are carried out over the internet 
allows the perpetrator ―to be hundreds or thousands of miles away from his victim.‖ Id. at 135.  
 138. There are multiple reasons that no ―overt‖ or ―credible‖ threat requirement should be 
included. Id. at 135–39.  
 First, culprits can instill very real fear in their victims without explicitly threatening them. Id. at 
136. Goodno points to Iowa v. Limbrecht, 600 N.W. 2d 316 (Iowa 1999), which was decided after 
Iowa updated its stalking law to use a reasonable-person standard in place of the formerly used 
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Finally, for all three crimes, the applicable actus reus should include a 
requirement of repetitive conduct. It is important that repetition be 
incorporated for all of the crimes because ―punishing merely one instance 
of harassing conduct may unjustly penalize one who acts once out of 
anger, verses one who engages in a series of terrifying acts.‖139 Even 
though each of the crimes should involve some degree of repetitive 
conduct, the extent or duration of the repetition required need not be the 
same for all three offenses, since it may serve as an indication of the 
perpetrator‘s intent (see discussion infra Part B).140 The number of times 
the communicated act must be repeated, or the length of time that public 
language must remain posted on a website to inflict distress before 
qualifying as criminal, should be left to the trier of fact‘s discretion, so 
long as the perpetrator is not convicted for a single or fleeting act. 
 
 
credible-threat standard, to demonstrate that stalking need not involve a threat. Goodno, supra note 18, 
at 136. 
 The Limbrecht defendant, a prison inmate, became obsessed with a young woman, 
Stacey Corey, who worked as an employee at the prison. The defendant‘s repetitive, 
intimidating stares and lies to other inmates about how he had sexual relations with her forced 
Corey to quit and move. However, the defendant‘s obsession continued when he was released 
from prison. He found Corey‘s new address and sent vulgar, untrue letters to Corey‘s husband 
about how Corey had sexual relations with many inmates when she worked at the prison. The 
defendant also drove by Corey‘s house a number of times, which ultimately led to his arrest 
and stalking conviction. . . . Under the amended version of the statute, which adopted the 
reasonable person standard, the court found that the defendant‘s actions assumed frightening 
proportions and was no less threatening than an actual threat.  
Id. at 136–37 (citing 600 N.W.2d at 316–19). 
 Second, ―[a] ‗threat‘ suggests a communication directly from the stalker to the victim,‖ but there 
are various methods by which perpetrators can interfere with their victims indirectly online, such as 
creating a website that targets them. Goodno, supra note 18, at 138. A third problem is that this 
requirement places an ―onerous and unnecessary‖ burden on the victim to show that the perpetrator 
was capable of carrying out the threat, while ―the victim may not even know the true identity or 
location‖ of the person victimizing him. Id.  
 Finally, ―[i]n situations where, for example, the cyberstalkers take on the identity of the victim 
and post messages inviting gang rape, there is neither an overt threat, nor a threat sent from the 
cyberstalker directly to the victim.‖ Id. at 139. As this example demonstrates, each of the crimes must 
account for communications by the culprit that intentionally cause the victim to suffer from unwanted 
contact by innocent third parties. 
 139. Id. at 134. Furthermore, since physical proximity and credible threat requirements, which 
may have warranted criminalizing conduct without repetition, are dispensed of in this scheme, there is 
an enhanced need to require repeated conduct before imposing criminal liability.  
 140. When the method of victimization used only requires a single act by the culprit, but still 
produced ongoing distress for the victim, such as the creation of a website or a public blog entry, the 
duration that the site is left visible to the public and the number of ―hits‖ from the public can serve as 
the indicators of ―repetition.‖  
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2. The Age of the Parties Involved 
Since it is increasingly evident that young people and adults alike are 
using the internet to victimize individuals, the age of the offender should 
not be a primary distinguishing factor in and of itself. Young people are 
capable of acting with malicious intent. On the other hand, adults can 
cause harm to another with bad, but less malicious, intent. While one‘s age 
is not dispositive of the degree of his intent, age may play a role in the 
context of the relationship between the perpetrator and the victim. In turn, 
the parties‘ relationship triggers different degrees of intent attributed to the 
culprit and thus different degrees of punishment.
141
 As one commentator 
exemplified,  
[i]f an adult male called an adult female a ―slut,‖ the comment 
would not likely support a cause of action in civil court; likewise, 
the same comment posted on a web site about a thirteen year-old 
girl would not support a cause of action, even though the young girl 
could be dramatically more affected than her adult counterpart.
142
  
The criminal scheme should account for the discrepancy in intentional acts 
that would clearly harm a minor, even though the same act might not harm 
an adult.
143
 
3. A Clause Eliminating Constitutionally Protected Speech from the 
Statute’s Reach 
In order to ensure that speech constitutionally protected by the First 
Amendment is not implicated, all three criminal laws should contain two 
provisions: First, the laws should provide that the speech at issue ―does not 
serve a legitimate purpose.‖ Second, the laws should include a statement 
 
 
 141. For example, when something objectively hurtful, but not necessarily malicious, is 
communicated, a reasonable person would expect a child‘s reaction to be more severe than an adult‘s. 
A reasonable person would also expect an adult to be more conscious than a child of the fact that such 
an action serves no legitimate purpose. Thus, inherently, adult perpetrators of harmful communication 
online are held to a higher standard than minors, and minors inherently require a lesser threshold when 
they are targeted as victims.  
 142. Erb, supra note 25, at 279 (emphasis added). 
 143. This will be especially evident when an adult is targeting a minor, but should be analyzed on 
a case-by-case basis regarding the facts specific to the circumstances of the culprit and victim 
involved. Acts by minors should not necessarily be entirely left out of the criminal scheme though. As 
cyber crime expert Jayne Hitchcock said of cyberbullying: ―‗Honestly, it's harassment and stalking . . . 
for kids and teens, we call it bullying. But it‘s basically the same thing.‘‖ Tim Grant, Orie: Make 
Cyber Bullying A Crime In State, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, June 27, 2006, http://www.post-
gazette.com/pg/06178/701401-51.stm.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
432 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87:407 
 
 
 
 
that the statute does not include constitutionally protected speech or 
activities.
144
 With these provisions in place, criminal laws covering all 
three forms of cyber victimization can be upheld, because it is well 
established that ―the right to free speech is not absolute.‖145 
B. Distinguishing Elements Between the Three Cyber Crimes 
1. The Perpetrator’s Specific Intent and the Victim’s Reasonable 
Reaction 
This proposed scheme involves a combined subjective test, for the 
perpetrator‘s intent, or mens rea, and objective test, for the victim‘s 
reaction. A combined test is ideal because, while each one standing alone 
has shortcomings,
146
 each one also provides an important protection to 
ensure that criminal liability is not improperly imposed. ―The inclusion of 
a subjective intent standard prevents punishment of innocuous speech 
misunderstood by a recipient . . . .‖147 Therefore, the perpetrator‘s actual 
intent with regard to his victimizing acts should always be ―willful,‖ even 
though the severity of the culprit‘s willful intention will differ for each 
crime. That said, ―an objective test is far more predictable and results in 
less self-censorship than its subjective counterpart.‖148 Accordingly, all 
cyber crimes should assess the victim‘s harm suffered using a reasonable 
person standard, even though the degree of objectively reasonable harm 
suffered will differ for each crime.  
The three cyber crimes are broken down under this proposed scheme 
by the following hierarchical system: First, cyberbullying is the least 
egregious of the crimes in terms of both the perpetrator‘s intent and the 
 
 
 144. See Commonwealth v. Welch, 825 N.E.2d 1005, 1018–19 (Mass. 2005) (listing decisions in 
which states ―have construed their statutes that proscribe harassing conduct or speech as 
constitutionally permissible,‖ most commonly because they ―contain some combination of the 
following limiting characteristics: a ‗willful,‘ ‗malicious,‘ or specific intent element; a requirement 
that the conduct be ‗directed at‘ an individual; a reasonable person standard; a statutory limitation that 
the conduct have ‗no legitimate purpose‘; and a savings clause excluding from the statute‘s reach 
constitutionally protected activity or communication.‖). 
 145. State v. Compas, 964 P.2d 703, 706 (Mont. 1998). ―Indeed, there are certain well-defined and 
narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought 
to raise any Constitutional problems. One of those classes of speech not protected by the First 
Amendment is activity intended to embarrass, annoy or harass.‖ Id. (internal citations and quotations 
omitted). 
 146. Hammack, supra note 38, at 96–100. 
 147. Id. at 97–98. 
 148. Id. at 101. 
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harm accordingly suffered.
149
 Cyberharassment requires a stronger degree 
of intent and harm.
150
 Finally, cyberstalking constitutes the most serious 
offense.
151
 Since an objectively reasonable standard is used to assess the 
victim‘s reaction, criminal liability would not ordinarily be imposed where 
a victim only suffers because he is particularly vulnerable. However, if a 
perpetrator has personal knowledge of his victim‘s unique susceptibility 
before targeting the victim, such knowledge should be considered in 
conjunction with the culprit‘s degree of culpability.152 
2. The Criminal Penalty Imposed on the Culprit 
In light of the varying degrees of ill-will attributed to perpetrators of 
each cyber crime, and the varying degrees of harm suffered by victims of 
each cyber crime, different penalties should be imposed to appropriately 
reflect these distinctions.
153
 States could, for example, make cyberbullying 
a simple violation or petty offense, punishable by a fine, with increased 
fines or degrees of culpability for repeat offenses. Cyberharassment could 
be a misdemeanor, imposing a higher fine or up to a year jail time for a 
first offense, and the potential for an increase to a stalking charge for a 
repeat offense. Cyberstalking, the most serious of the crimes, could be a 
felony subjecting those held guilty to the highest fines and the potential to 
serve greater jail time. 
C. Why This Proposed Scheme is Ideal and How It Would Look in Effect 
This scheme is ideal because it would ensure that juveniles and adults 
alike are held accountable for cyber victimization, but it would only 
 
 
 149. Cyberbullying should be found to occur when a person intentionally and repeatedly engages 
in behavior over the internet that serves no legitimate purpose, which the person should reasonably 
expect to cause the targeted individual to feel annoyed, humiliated, or ridiculed, and which would 
cause a reasonable person emotional distress.  
 150. Cyberharassment should be found to occur when a person intentionally and repeatedly 
engages in behavior over the internet that serves no legitimate purpose, which the person should 
reasonably expect to cause the targeted individual to feel harassed, alarmed, or intimidated and which 
would cause a reasonable person emotional distress.  
 151. Cyberstalking should be found to occur when a person maliciously and repeatedly engages in 
behavior over the internet that serves no legitimate purpose, which the person should reasonably 
expect to cause the targeted individual to feel terrorized, tormented, or fearful for his or her safety and 
which would cause a reasonable person to suffer ongoing fear or emotional distress.  
 152. The culprit‘s awareness of the targeted individual‘s vulnerability, if likely to enhance his 
resulting emotional distress, is indicative of a stronger degree of ill-intent. 
 153. While specific penalties will inevitably vary by state, the important distinction in this scheme 
is that penalties be distinguishable and adequately reflect the distinct degree of criminal liability 
attributed to each crime. 
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impose penalties appropriate to the severity of the crime in each possible 
situation.  
First, in the peer-to-peer context, minors could be held liable for 
victimizing fellow minors online. Take, for example, a particular past 
situation involving seniors in high school ―that posted the sexual history, 
names, and addresses of their fellow female students on a website [and] 
were initially charged with second-degree harassment, which carries a 
sentence of up to one year in jail and a $1,000 fine.‖154 In that case, the 
charges were soon after dropped because the ―District Attorney announced 
that, although the material on the web site was ‗offensive and abhorrent,‘ 
it did not meet the legal definition of harassment.‖155 Under the scheme 
proposed in this Note, the students could have been liable for 
cyberbullying if they acted with the requisite intent, because a jury would 
likely find that a reasonable woman would feel humiliated if such 
information was posted on the internet without her permission or initial 
knowledge. Likewise, a jury would probably find that the perpetrators 
should have reasonably expected the victimized women to suffer 
emotional distress when they learned what was posted about them.
156
  
The possibility of minors using the internet to victimize adults, such as 
teachers or school administrators, presents another scenario. In light of the 
current unclear distinctions for acts of cyber victimization, this presents a 
gray area that is currently difficult to categorize. In the J.S. v. Bethlehem 
Area School District case previously discussed,
157
 this scheme would 
impose criminal liability where civil and criminal remedies failed 
before.
158
 In this case, the websites created by students stating why their 
teacher should be fired and depicting their teacher as Hitler were not 
technically defamatory, but as ―the presiding judge stated . . . ‗[t]hey were 
a lot of other things: They were distasteful, they were rude, they were 
 
 
 154. Erb, supra note 25, at 275 (internal citation omitted). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Furthermore, this scheme makes it more likely that young people will truly be held liable for 
victimizing their peers. Currently, as Erb explained, ―[i]n the rare cases where a student is criminally 
convicted of Internet harassment, appellate courts have been reluctant to enforce such penalties.‖ Id. 
Since, under this proposed scheme, a cyberbullying offense would not impose the harsh punishment of 
jail time, appellate courts would likely be less reluctant to enforce the penalty. The imposition of a 
significant fine would still be effective, however, because it would likely prevent students from 
repeating such behavior in the future. It may also make parents more aware of and interested in 
monitoring their children‘s behavior on the internet. See Lesser Charges, supra note 110 (recognizing, 
according to U.S. Attorney Thomas, the ―worthy message‖ that was sent by the jury‘s decision to 
convict Lori Drew: ―‗If you have children who are on the Internet and you are not watching what they 
are doing, you better be.‘‖). 
 157. See supra text accompanying notes 123–24. 
 158. Erb, supra note 25, at 277–78. 
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crude, they were obscene.‘‖159 Under the proposed scheme, the students‘ 
actions would at least qualify as cyberbullying since they could reasonably 
have expected that the offensive websites would upset and humiliate their 
teacher, whose resulting emotional distress manifested itself both mentally 
and physically, ultimately driving the educator to stop teaching.
160
 
Next, as the Megan Meier incident demonstrates, there can also be 
problems with adults victimizing minors online.
161
 This, too, currently 
falls into a gray area that is difficult to categorize. For example, literature 
surrounding the Megan Meier incident typically refers to cyberbullying
162
 
because the victim was a minor and the perpetrator acted under the guise 
of a minor. However, the fact that Drew was actually an adult makes that 
categorization seem out of place. Under the proposed scheme, the fact that 
Drew was an adult preying upon a minor, of whose vulnerable mental state 
she was aware,
163
 makes her intent more malicious, and would likely raise 
this to the level of cyberharassment.  
Finally, when adults victimize adults online, the proposed scheme 
could, as with the other scenarios, potentially impose liability under any of 
the three crimes depending on the specific circumstances of the case. 
Regardless of the crime attributed to the culprit in a particular adult-to-
adult scenario, the proposed scheme would account for the unique 
circumstances of the internet where many current state statutes on regular 
harassment or stalking fail to suffice. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The internet has advanced modern communication by providing people 
with innumerable benefits. Yet, those same advancements have also 
enhanced the ease and frequency with which people harboring animosity 
toward others can victimize targeted individuals. The prevalent use of the 
internet by adults and minors alike has rendered internet victimization an 
expansive problem reaching people of various ages and circumstances. In 
light of this modern trend, states should impose criminal liability 
 
 
 159. Id. at 278. 
 160. Id.  
 161. See infra text accompanying notes 1–14. 
 162. Kravitz, supra note 119 (―In what legal experts are calling the country‘s first cyber-bullying 
verdict, a Missouri mother has been convicted of impersonating a teenage boy online in a hoax that led 
to a young girl‘s suicide.‖). 
 163. ABC News, Parents Want Jail Time for MySpace Hoax Mom, Nov. 29, 2007, http://abcnews. 
go.com/GMA/Story?id=3929774&page=1 (―Megan sometimes suffered from low self-esteem and was 
on medication at the time of her death. ‗That is what makes it even more disgusting, that she knew the 
circumstances around our daughter and still played on it,‘ said Megan's father, Ron Meier.‖). 
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following a scheme that accounts for perpetrators and victims of any age, 
and that distinguishes degrees of punishment based on the severity of the 
situation. Such laws would correctly punish those who intentionally act in 
a foreseeably harmful way toward others over the internet, deterring the 
continuance of such conduct by perpetrators and bringing justice to the 
victims who suffered as a result.  
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